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time and place by offering visitors new symbolic 
experiences beyond those constrained by 
buildings, ownership, or location (Beetlestone 
et al. 1998), and creating and reinforcing a sense 
of identity and culture in the face of the forces 
of globalisation (Knell 2011). These functions 
arguably entail the sparking and harnessing of 
the visitor’s imagination, yet few studies have 
addressed the role of the visitor’s imagination 
in their exhibition experiences (Bedford 2004, 
Dufresne-Tassé et al. 2006). Here, I present 
and discuss a framework for observing and 
describing the influence of the imagination on 
museum visits, and I argue for its utility in the 
The imagination plays an all-important role 
in museums. In 1958, Katharine Beneker 
discussed the ability of exhibitions to “fire the 
imagination” of visitors, carrying them into 
new, previously unknown areas of knowledge. 
Today, this quality is perhaps more important 
than ever (Asma 2001:38ff., McLean 2007), 
as the traditional functions of museums are 
redefined and subsumed into new meta-
functions (Dubuc 2011). Such meta-functions 
include a renewed perspective on museum 
education as engaging with content in a variety 
of tangible and intangible ways (Dubuc 2011), 
generating the conditions for the suspension of 
Abstract: The imagination plays an important role in museums, today more 
than ever. Visitors use their repositories of imagination or repertoires to make 
sense of their encounters with objects and exhibits. In this article, I argue that this 
initial meaning making, rather than being the end goal of museum interpretation, 
should be thought of as the point of departure for further, more scientific meaning 
making. I present a framework developed by Colette Dufresne-Tassé et al. (2006) 
and show how it can be used to identify the variety of visitor repertoires at work 
in their imagination processes. I argue that becoming familiar with commonly 
occurring repertoires is necessary for exhibition designers in order for museums to 
continue to take their interpretive responsibility seriously, and I discuss how such a 
familiarisation may affect museum practice. I conclude with some perspectives on 
the implications of the framework for museum research.
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epistemology (Conn 2010:7f.) was succeeded 
by a conception of meaning making as taking 
place in relation to the individual. In this new 
object-based discourse, the object’s participation 
in the cultural or lived history of the visitor was 
thought to play a central role in the imaginative 
processes. This conception was based on a 
growing realisation that visitors brought their 
own, equally valid voices to the encounter, and 
that these voices were the basis of the meaning 
created in the visitors’ experiences with the 
objects (Evans et al. 2002, Meszaros 2006). This 
perspective remains influential today among 
museum professionals (cf. Roberts 1997:60ff., 
Adams et al. 2003).
A disadvantage to shifting the interpretative 
authority from the museum and placing it in the 
hands of the visitor is that the scientific nature 
of the museum objects may be “relegated to a 
supporting part” (Evans et al. 2002:58). This is 
problematic, not just because it obscures the 
natural history or science of an object (Evans et 
al. 2002), but because it can be used in a wider 
sense to absolve the museum of interpretative 
responsibility (Meszaros 2006): If the museum 
has no control over the way visitors interpret 
the objects in exhibitions, surely it cannot be 
responsible for these interpretations? There 
are, however, problems with this argument. 
Even though most would agree with the 
basic notion that all knowledge construction 
is based on context and prior knowledge, 
this does not mean that cultural or scientific 
knowledge should be disregarded in the name 
of personal meaning. Nor does it mean, by 
extension, that any failure of the museum to 
communicate scientific content is justified 
(Meszaros 2006, Shettel 2008). Rather, it is 
important to acknowledge that the imaginative 
processing of museum visitors arises from a 
variety of repertoires which certainly include 
the visitor’s existing knowledge, but also 
design of museum experiences. Finally, I offer 
some perspectives on the implications of the 
framework. I take my point of departure in 
science and natural history museums, although 
I believe that the perspectives presented here 
have wider application.
Throughout this text, I view imagination as 
the essential capacity that enables us to form a 
mental representation of something (Gendler 
2013). It allows us to see and think in new ways, 
and to create fictive situations and possibilities 
(Bedford 2004). Imagination is involved in the 
synthesis of new knowledge because it allows 
us to create mental constructions based on 
observation, existing knowledge, and what is 
not present (Greene 1988); it is thus central 
to learning (Sneath et al. 2009, Hadzigeorgiou 
2015). It is distinct from memory in that 
imagining something does not require that 
something to be or to have been the case, 
whereas remembering something does 
(Gendler 2013). 
Imagination and museums
In natural history museums in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
visitors’ meaning making of the objects on 
display was thought to be governed mainly by 
the authority of those objects. In other words, 
the authentic scientific voice of the objects and 
their setting-in-scene in exhibitions constituted 
the authority of the imaginary processes 
(mental images, situations, and possibilities) 
that occurred in the visitor’s interactions with 
the exhibition (Evans et al. 2002, Meszaros 
2006). The presumed ability of the scientific 
objects to speak for themselves served to 
maintain the museum’s authority to present the 
“truth” (Roberts 1997:60ff.), while ignoring the 
perspective of the visitor (Wertsch 2002).
In the 20th century, this object-based 
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by Dufresne-Tassé et al. (2006), that describes 
and categorises the imaginative functioning of 
museum visitors. I exemplify the framework 
using an empirical data set, collected as part 
of another study (Achiam et al. 2014). Briefly, 
these data consist of observations and audio-
recordings of visitors’ think aloud verbalisations 
(van Someren et al. 1994) as they contemplated 
either dioramas (fig. 1) or animal specimens in 
a discovery room (fig. 2) at the Natural History 
Museum of Denmark. Six adults were observed 
include the object’s scientific nature, its specific 
affordances and setting-in-stage, the designer’s 
intentions, etc. (Roberts 1997:137ff., Gurian 
1999). What is lacking in a more current per-
spective, then, is a model that can link scientific 
knowledge to personal interpretation as a way 
of understanding how our imagination shapes 
our actions in designed environments in 
museums (Meszaros 2006). 
With a point of departure in this observation, I 
now present an analytical framework, developed 
Fig. 1. A diorama in the 
Natural History Museum 
of Denmark. The diorama 
features a deciduous forest 
habitat with a lynx (Lynx 
lynx) and a wild boar 
(Sus scrofa). Photo: Mari-
anne Achiam, 2013. 
Fig. 2. The discovery room 
at the Natural History 
Museum of Denmark. The 
discovery room features 
a number af taxidermied 
specimens of Danish and 
Nordic wildlife as well as 
other objects (e.g. skulls, 
bones, furs, and preserved 
invertebrates in jars). 




When visitors exclaim, they express their 
reaction to an object with a simple expression 
such as “Oh” or “Wow”. Their feelings are 
not articulated in a sentence, and the mental 
operation is purely affective.
When visitors observe or find, they essentially 
recognise familiar aspects of what they are 
looking at. For example, they might say: “There’s 
a little beetle.” Their mental operation is mainly 
cognitive.
When visitors identify an object, they assign 
it a name, establish its author, or establish the 
time of its creation. They usually do this using 
the label. Because the information is treated 
factually, their mental activity is primarily 
cognitive. For example, they might say: “This 
is a roe deer, with two lambs.”
When visitors verify their own knowledge 
or observation, they check the accuracy of it. 
They take a factual approach, so their activity 
is usually cognitive. For example: “I guess it’s 
nowadays, but I don’t really…? (reads) Oh 
yeah! It’s nowadays.”
When visitors judge, they estimate or 
determine the value of what they are looking 
at by objective or subjective criteria. When 
the criterion is objective, the visitor’s mental 
activity is usually cognitive, for example: “I can 
mostly hear the water instead of the animals.” 
In contrast, when the criterion is subjective, the 
verdict is pronounced according to the visitors’ 
personal taste, and their activity is mostly 
affective. Example: “I like the scenery of another 
Danish forest.”
The second family of mental operations 
consists of associate, predict, and suggest. 
These operations require the use of the 
imagination; that is, they take place through 
the evocation or representation of something 
that is not with the visitor in the exhibition, 
but that exists in the past, present, or future, or 
even as a potential or virtual thing (Dufresne-
and recorded at dioramas, and six adults 
were observed and recorded in the discovery 
room. I use these data here, specifically the 
verbalisations, to illustrate the utility of the 
analytical framework developed by Dufresne-
Tassé et al. (2006) in understanding how our 
imagination shapes our actions in museums 
and in identifying the repertoires that are 
involved in the process. Finally, I discuss how 
the framework can help museum professionals 
re-address their interpretative responsibilities 
and make visible and explicit the repertoires 
that shape their work.
Analytical framework
As outlined in the introduction, imagination is 
understood here as the capacity of visitors to 
evoke or represent something that is not with 
them in the exhibition, but that may be from 
the past, exist contemporaneously with the 
visit, be from the future, be potential or even 
virtual. In a study of 90 visitors to exhibitions 
at three different museums, Dufresne-Tassé et 
al. (2006) used the think aloud method (van 
Someren et al. 1994) to access visitors’ mental 
processes. From the transcriptions of visitors’ 
discourse, Dufresne-Tassé et al. constructed 
an exhaustive list of fourteen different kinds 
of mental operations. Of these operations, 
five do not require the use of the imagination, 
three require the use of the imagination, and 
six are possible both with and without the 
intervention of the imagination.
The first family of operations consists of 
exclaim, observe, identify, verify, and judge. 
These operations use only the cognitive or 
affective aspects of mental processing, and do 
not require visitors to use their imagination. 
Visitors either process information as a fact 
or express their reaction to what they see, as 
shown in the following examples:
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at first. But it’s another kind of bird (reading 
label).” An example involving the imagination 
is: “Is it a baby [roe deer]? No, it has to be an 
adult – it has horns.”
When comparing, visitors establish the 
similarities and differences (and thus the 
relationship) between what they observe and 
something else. This “something else” may be 
located in the same place as they are; in this 
case, the activity does not require imagination. 
For example: “And again, in comparison with 
the sika next to it, how big [the wild boar] 
is!” If the comparison is made to something 
outside the visitors’ vicinity, their mental 
activity requires the use of the imagination. 
For example: “The lynx looks kind of like a 
teddy bear.” 
When visitors grasp, they discover the 
meaning of one or more objects or the way 
they work, with or without the use of their 
imagination. Example (without imagination): 
“It’s a pelican! Okay, interesting. I didn’t know 
it was here [in Denmark].” Example (with 
imagination): “Oh, I actually thought they had 
larger tusks than that [about a wild boar].”
When visitors clarify, they invoke a new 
element, a feature that helps to deepen what 
they are able to say or do, with or without the 
help of their imagination. An example without 
the use of the imagination could be: “It gives 
me a romantic impression of life here; there are 
no dangerous things in it.” An example which 
includes the use of the imagination could be: 
“I might miss some of the background for this; 
I mean, why did they end up living here, why 
did they die out, and how similar are they to 
the animals today?”
When modifying, visitors nuance or diminish 
either their position or their perspective. 
The activity can be carried out with the help 
of their imagination or without it. Example 
(without the imagination): “I don’t really see 
Tassé et al. 2006), as shown in the following 
examples:
To associate means that visitors connect 
what is being observed with information from 
their experience. They say, for example: “It 
makes me think about the south of Denmark, 
Møns Klint.”
When visitors predict, they anticipate 
something that is yet-to-be, or just a possibility 
or hypothesis. For example, they might say: 
“Probably there are quite many ants [in that 
forest].” 
When suggesting, visitors propose something 
outside their immediate context or they 
recommend a change in what they observe. An 
example could be: “There’s this black slug; why 
did they decide to show that? I mean, it could 
have been ants on the ground, or small snails, 
or mosquitoes, or…”
The third and final family of mental operations 
consists of justify-explain, resolve, compare, 
grasp, clarify, and modify. These operations are 
possible without the use of the imagination, as 
the visitor may use the exhibition for assistance. 
However, as the following examples will show, 
the imagination is frequently involved in these 
operations:
When visitors justify-explain, they motivate, 
test or prove their position, using evidence to 
do so. Example without imagination: “I tried 
to listen for the birds, but there was too much 
noise at that point.” Faced with a diorama of 
prehistoric Danish woodland, and using their 
imagination they might say: “It’s different from 
the scenery that you would see today and the 
coastline. There’s much more nature… it also 
seems quite undisturbed.”
When visitors resolve, they find the solution 
to a problem. They reduce or remove an 
obstacle to further reasoning or the conclusion. 
An example that does not require the use of 
the imagination is: “I thought it was penguins, 
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In this case, the visitor is mentally producing 
a scenario of a different diorama, suggesting 
that this imaginary diorama is as valid as the 
observed one. 
In sum, the reproductive component of the 
imagination mainly serves to integrate what 
is shown in the exhibition with the visitor’s 
experience, while the creative component of 
the imagination is largely responsible for the 
deepening, structuring, and enriching of the 
universe of meaning surrounding the objects 
in the exhibition (cf. Dufresne-Tassé et al. 
2006). The authors propose the mechanism of 
imaginary functioning to be the following:
Imagination promotes first a personal contribution, 
an initial investment through which a formal 
relationship is established between the object and 
the information held by the visitor (reproductive 
imagination). This establishment situates the 
object […] and creates a first level of familiarity 
with it. With the aid of this familiarity, visitors can 
more easily carry out other types of investment, 
enriching, deepening, strengthening and structuring 
the universe of meaning they create (creative 
imagination) (Dufresne-Tassé et al. 2006:172, my 
translation).
The mechanism proposed by Dufresne-Tassé 
et al. (2006) is consistent with a constructivist 
perspective of learning: A process of con-
struction based on a person’s prior lived 
experiences and understandings as well as the 
ways in which that person actively interacts 
with the world around them (Hadzigeorgiou 
2015). The imagination is thus a kind of 
meaning making “engine” because it drives 
the initial reproductive establishment of the 
relationship between the object and the visitor 
by synthesising a conscious conception of 
what is seen, and the subsequent creative 
mobilisation of the person’s background 
many other animals here, but there’re quite a 
few beech trees. It’s all beech forest, actually.” 
Example (with the imagination): “And one 
of the first things is that it maybe looks like 
a seaside that I know, except for the fact that 
there are quite big animals.”
How does imagination shape action 
in museums? 
Dufresne-Tassé et al. (2006) use the analytical 
framework presented in the preceding to show 
that when visitors use their imagination, they 
spend longer time in museum exhibitions, 
and have richer and more fully-developed 
interactions with the objects in them. According 
to these authors, this effect is due to an 
enrichment of the semantic universe created by 
the visitor around the object. Dufresne-Tassé et 
al. (2006) further observe that the imagination 
plays this role, sometimes through its 
reproductive component, sometimes through 
its creative component.1 The reproductive 
component is at play when visitors associate 
or use their imagination to compare, because 
they are linking what they observe with what 
they already know or have experienced (cf. 
Dufresne-Tassé et al. 2006). In the example of 
association shown above, the visitor says about 
a diorama “It makes me think about the south 
of Denmark, Møns Klint”, retrieving from their 
memory the characteristics of Møns Klint.
Conversely, the creative component is at 
play when visitors use their imagination to 
predict, suggest, justify-explain, resolve, grasp, 
clarify, or modify, because they are creating 
mental scenarios (cf. Dufresne-Tassé et al. 
2006). In the example of suggestion shown 
above, the visitor says about a diorama: “There’s 
this black slug; why did they decide to show 
that? I mean, it could have been ants on the 
ground, or small snails, or mosquitoes, or…” 
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hunting in Denmark. Clearly, he is drawing 
on a repertoire of his own personal experience 
(perhaps he is a hunter himself) to make this 
statement. Conversely, another (female) visitor 
facing the same diorama states: “I get a lot of 
questions or stories that could have been told, 
but aren’t part of the picture. I mean, how old 
do they get, what do they eat, who will eat 
them, and so on. Eh, there are a lot of stories, 
but untold.” This visitor is carrying out an 
operation of suggestion, using her imagination 
in a creative way to propose potential “stories” 
that in her opinion ought to have been 
addressed by the diorama. This visitor clearly 
draws on a repertoire regarding her perception 
of the educational obligations of a natural 
history museum. In both cases, the visitors 
use their imagination to make meaning of 
the encounter, and in both cases, the visitors 
draw on their individual repertoires as well as 
the observable features of the diorama in this 
meaning making.
In sum, I suggest that the analytical 
framework developed by Dufresne-Tassé et 
al. (2006) can be used as a means to identify 
instances of imaginary functioning among 
visitors; instances that can then be interrogated 
to clarify the embodied repertoires. This 
process, I suggest, is part of the collective task 
of museum professionals outlined by Meszaros 
(2006): Becoming familiar with the many kinds 
of meaning making repertoires so we can 
attend to their power over us. In the following, I 
contextualise these arguments and discuss their 
implications for museum practice at the levels of 
visitor meaning making, exhibit design, and the 
reflective practices of museum staff members.
Discussion
I have argued for a renewed focus on the 
dissemination responsibilities of natural 
beliefs, memories, and expectations in order 
to create what is not seen. Taken together, the 
notions of imagination and constructivism 
thus explain how museum visitors’ various 
repertoires influence their processes of meaning 
making in exhibitions. In the next section, I 
will develop the notion of repertoire, and show 
how the analytical framework can help museum 
professionals identify the repertoires at work in 
the interpretative work of museum visitors.
Repertoires and their influence on 
the imaginary process
Repertoires may be understood as visitors’ 
repositories of meaning making, that is, the 
knowledge, experience, assumptions, and 
conjectures that underlie their interpretation 
of objects and exhibitions. Although they are 
involved in creating a conscious conception 
of sensory input, the repertoires themselves 
are mobilised somewhat unconsciously by 
visitors, which makes them difficult to observe 
and identify. Yet, as Meszaros (2006) states, 
we as museum professionals cannot ignore 
them because they are powerful shapers of the 
interpretative process. 
I suggest that the analytical framework 
developed by Dufresne-Tassé et al. can be 
used as a means to identify and observe 
repertoires in action among museum visitors, 
because the framework allows us to identify 
mental operations that involve imaginary 
processing, and because at the foundation of 
this imaginary processing, we find repertoires. 
Consider the following examples: Facing a 
diorama featuring a forest with a roe deer, 
one (male) visitor says: “It’s more, like, species 
for hunting you see.” This visitor is carrying 
out an operation of association, using his 
imagination in a reproductive way to identify 
the deer as a common object of recreational 
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repertoires commonly employed by visitors, 
museum professionals would become better 
able to predict and accommodate visitors’ 
various points of departure and thus to plan 
for their further experiences, helping them 
make scientific meaning of the content matter 
(cf. Hein 2006).
Second, there is evidence to suggest that 
exhibit genre acts as a significant prompt of 
visitor response (Macdonald 2007, Pedretti 
2012, Achiam et al. 2014). For example, the 
diorama is an exhibit genre intended to illustrate 
the natural interactions between the animals, 
plants, geography, and climate of a given biome 
(Fortin-Debart 2003, Marandino et al. 2015) 
and indeed, it seems that visitors in many cases 
are prompted by dioramas to act as naturalists, 
observing the behaviours and relationships 
on display and drawing on their ecology 
repertoire to interpret what they see (Ash 2004, 
Reiss & Tunnicliffe 2011, Piqueras et al. 2012). 
For example, Piqueras et al. (2012) report 
how a diorama showing scavengers at a deer 
carcass embodies an explicit curatorial intent 
to challenge the curiosity and imagination of 
the visitors by including “clues” to the main 
scene. Accordingly, the designers have placed 
yellow spots and footprints on the diorama’s 
artificial snow; these are signs of a fox that has 
previously visited the carcass and taken away 
its head (a common behaviour among foxes). 
In their study of visitors’ meaning making at 
this diorama, the authors show how these 
clues and details indeed do trigger visitors to 
conjecture about which animal killed the deer 
and took its head, using and building upon 
their existing ecology repertoire. I suggest 
that understanding the relationship between 
an exhibit genre and the visitor repertoires it 
tends to mobilise is an important step towards 
improved museum interpretation, because 
it allows exhibition designers to better take 
science museums. Although to many readers 
it may seem self-evident that museums 
should take responsibility for the scientific 
meaning making their exhibitions engender, 
past decades have seen a shift, within both 
museum research and practice, away from 
the intellectual interaction between the visitor 
and the exhibit (Meszaros 2006, Shettel 2008). 
Indeed, one of the most influential (cf. Phipps 
2010) conceptual frameworks in museum 
research, the Contextual Model of Learning 
(Falk & Dierking 2000, 2013), describes the 
museum experience without reference to the 
content of what is exhibited or the imaginative 
trajectories made possible by that content. 
Although it was never the intention of Falk and 
Dierking (nor of constructivism) to celebrate 
personal meaning making to the exclusion of 
scientific or cultural knowledge, the framing 
of the museum experience as a strongly 
personalised event may inadvertently have 
contributed to the exile of cultural or scientific 
knowledge from the collective consciousness 
of museum researchers and practitioners. This 
is what Cheryl Meszaros refers to as
the highly selective uptake of constructivist 
learning principles that […] prioritizes personal 
meaning-making as the end product of the 
museum encounter rather than the beginning of 
interpretation (Meszaros 2006:13).
It is against this backdrop that my proposal 
should be read.
What would it mean for museums to fully 
take on the task of interpretative responsibility? 
First of all, it would mean that rather than 
accepting whatever initial meaning a museum 
visitor makes of an encounter with an object or 
exhibit, the museum should view this meaning 
as the point of departure for further, scientific 
meaning making. By identifying the kinds of 
97
The role of the imagination in museum visits
museums rely on mobilising the imaginary 
processes of their visitors to fulfil their 
new institutional meta-functions and must 
accordingly renew their efforts to address their 
interpretive responsibility; the perspectives 
presented here offer one way of doing so.
From a research point of view, I note that 
although the notion of repertoire originated 
in an art museum context (cf. Knutson & 
Crowley 2006), it has similarities to constructs 
from other research domains, no doubt due 
to shared constructivist origins. For example, 
from a science education research context, 
Stocklmayer and Gilbert’s (2002) notion of 
“remindings” as the ideas, objects, events, 
or processes that shape a visitor’s exhibit 
interaction seems to have similar implications. 
And from a tourism research perspective, 
Voase (2002:391) observes that when visitors 
encounter a museum attraction, the meaning 
they make is shaped as much by their own 
memories, interests and concerns as by the 
encounter. It seems, then, that the constructivist 
notion that visitors make their own meanings 
in museums is broadly accepted in the research 
community (even if it is sometimes selectively 
applied). This prompts the final question: 
What is our role as researchers in furthering 
an agenda of re-addressing “interpretative 
responsibility” in museums?
As researchers, our role is probably not to be 
the agents of change in museums. Our strength 
lies in being able to step outside the educational 
system under investigation, and we are thus 
not obliged to take for granted the existing 
organisation of a scientific subject or theme 
as it is represented in an exhibition, as if it 
were the only one possible. This position gives 
us a unique opportunity to help identify and 
challenge occurrences of unspoken, unseen 
repertoires from which acts of interpretation 
arise, whether they originate among museum 
advantage of the “distinct ways of mediation of 
the genre in question” (Achiam et al. 2014:478).
Finally, I observe that although the 
focus here has been on the repertoires of 
museum visitors, it is easy to imagine how 
the repertoires of exhibition designers can be 
powerful co-authors of how and why an exhibit 
or exhibition takes a given shape. Lindauer 
(2005) showed how exhibition designers have 
rather tacit ways of approaching exhibition 
design; ways that are not always consistently 
applied across the design team or even by the 
same individual. To the extent that we can 
think of these design approaches as being 
governed by the repertoires available to the 
designers, we can see how repertoires indeed do 
influence the design process. Acknowledging 
that museum professionals make assumptions 
about science content and science education 
when they produce educational environments 
and activities, even if these assumptions are tacit 
or inconsistent with one another (cf. Lindauer 
2005, Mortensen 2010), is an important 
step towards understanding what kinds of 
repertoires underlie these assumptions and 
deciding whether they contribute to producing 
the desired characteristics in the final product. 
Ultimately, this will lead to more well-reflected 
design practices.
Conclusion and perspectives for 
research
In conclusion, I find that the framework of 
imaginary functioning (Dufresne-Tassé et al. 
2006) combined with the notion of repertoire 
(Meszaros 2006) offers a tool to help identify 
and understand the imaginary processes 
of visitors in their interpretive work, and 
ultimately, to contribute to a better alignment 
between this interpretive work and the goals 
and objectives of the museum. Present-day 
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staff and manifest themselves in exhibition 
design, or among visitors, where they shape 
the ways in which meaning making can take 
place. But we can only assist and inform the 
(r)evolution of museums; the true agents of 
change must be the museum professionals 
(cf. Heimlich, 2006) who have the power to 
radically re-think their practices. 
Notes
1. Dufresne-Tassé et al. (2006) draw on Kant 
when they discuss the reproductive and creative 
components of the imagination. While their 
interpretation of Kant does not, strictly speaking, 
align with my understanding, I retain their 
Kant-inspired idea of distinguishing between 
the reproductive and creative components of 
imagination due to its practical applicability.
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